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FOREWORD
China’s space program has achieved spectacular
success in recent years. Since 2003 China has launched
two human space flight missions, destroyed a
satellite with a direct ascent anti-satellite weapon,
and launched a moon orbiter. In this monograph, Mr.
Kevin Pollpeter assesses China’s rise as a space power
and its implications for the United States. He argues
that China’s use of space power is part of an integrated
approach to increasing its comprehensive national
power and achieving great power status. As a result,
China’s increasing space power challenges the United
States militarily, economically, commercially, and
politically.
China’s increasing space capabilities will erode the
U.S. lead in space in both absolute and relative terms.
Nevertheless, the loss of preeminence in space need not
result in the United States losing its role as the leading
space power. To maintain its lead, the United States
will not only need to improve technologically, but also
train and keep a competent workforce, develop new
and innovative ways to compete commercially, and
expand the role of space in its exercise of soft power.
To this end, this monograph offers valuable insights
into China’s rise as a space power as well as a number
of policies designed to respond to the challenges it
presents.
		
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
The advance of the Chinese space program has
laid a foundation for that country to enter into the top
tier of space powers. In recent years, China has made
important progress across a broad range of space
technologies including launchers, launch schedules,
satellites, and human space flight, and has taken a
leading role in regional space cooperation.
This monograph examines how the United States
should respond to China’s rise as a major space power
based on China’s space activities during the period
of the Tenth 5-Year Plan (2001-05). It finds that the
Chinese space program made impressive gains during
the Tenth 5-year Plan, but when compared with the
other major space powers, China’s space technology
still lags behind.
China’s burgeoning space program provides
opportunities for China to use the benefits derived
from space power to become a more influential and
respected nation. While China does not have an official
grand strategy, the Chinese leadership appears to
have reached a consensus on a plan which sustains
the conditions necessary for economic growth and
military modernization in the context of operating in
a unipolar world dominated by the United States. This
strategy is designed to ultimately usher in a multipolar
world in which China is one of several great powers
by protecting China’s core national interests against
external threats and by shaping the international
system in which it operates.
To this end, China’s space program is intended to
portray China as a modernizing nation committed to
the peaceful use of space while at the same time serving
China’s political, economic, and military interests. It
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contributes to China’s overall influence and provides
capabilities that give China more freedom of action and
opportunities for international leadership. Militarily,
the People’s Liberation Army is undergoing reforms
to transform itself into a military that is reliant on
information for winning wars. Economically, China’s
support for its space program lies in its potential as a
driver for economic and technological advancement.
Commercially, China is positioning itself as a low cost
provider of space technologies and launch services.
Commercial services not only increase revenues for
the space industry but have also been used to advance
China’s diplomatic interests with oil-rich countries.
Politically, China’s expanding international cooperation on space activities portends a more influential foreign policy. Domestically, by developing a robust space
program and participating in high-profile activities
such as human space flight, the Communist Party
demonstrates that it is the best provider of material
benefits to the Chinese people and the best organization
to propel China to its rightful place in world affairs.
China’s rise as a space power will present military,
economic, and political challenges to the United States.
Uncertainty over China’s pathway to potential major
power status, the possibility of a conflict over Taiwan,
and the inherent dual-use nature of space technologies
means that China’s improving space capabilities could
be used against the U.S. military. China’s efforts to
develop its space program to transform itself into an
economically and technologically powerful country
may also come at the expense of U.S. leadership in
both absolute and relative terms. China has also been
able to use its space program to further its diplomatic
objectives and to increase its influence in the developing
world and among second-tier space powers.
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China’s increasingly capable space program
will have a net negative-sum effect on the United
States and requires both domestic and international
responses by the United States. Domestically, the
U.S. Government and industry must improve the
health of its space industry through better program
management, attracting and retaining a competent
workforce, and increasing funding to develop cutting
edge technologies. Internationally, the United States
must take into account China’s growing presence in
world affairs, including space activities.
The rise of China as a space power also raises the
question of whether the United States should cooperate
with China in space. The difficulty in deciding an
appropriate response arises from the inability of both
sides to determine whether their relationship will be
friendly or hostile. Nevertheless, the United States is
presented with four policy options to meet the changing
dynamics presented by China’s space program: contain,
compete, cooperate, and do nothing.
Containment is the least viable of the four options,
and as China becomes more integrated with the world,
it will become even less practical.
Competition may also be problematic. U.S.-China
relations may be ambivalent, but extensive cooperation
does take place in many araeas, and it is not apparent
how defining China as a competitor in a space race will
further relations. It is also not apparent whether the
American public will support a race which will require
additional funding with little short-term gain.
Cooperation, on the other hand, has the potential
to increase transparency and trust and to lessen
competitive aspects that may lead to armed conflict. A
policy that treats China as a friend, however, has its own
shortcomings. Because China’s strategy is designed

ix

to further its own national interests and because its
interests are often not aligned with U.S. interests, it
is unlikely that assisting China in increasing its space
power may eliminate these differences and may, in
fact, exacerbate them.
Doing nothing is a safe option that does not risk
the transfer of technology or expertise. A policy of
inaction does risk ignoring the possible benefits of
cooperation.
While the inherent military nature of China’s space
program and its lack of transparency preclude most
forms of cooperation, the United States can cooperate
with China in beneficial ways that do not transfer
technology or expertise. These include coordinating
scientific research and increasing the safety of human
spaceflight by establishing a code of conduct to rescue
imperiled astronauts. Consequently, the challenge for
the United States is to manage the positive-sum and
negative-sum consequences of China’s ascendant
space program by improving its space industry, better
enabling its military to counter space-based threats,
and engaging in cooperative activities that improve
science and increase the safety of human space flight.
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BUILDING FOR THE FUTURE:
CHINA’S PROGRESS IN SPACE TECHNOLOGY
DURING THE TENTH FIVE-YEAR PLAN
AND THE U.S. RESPONSE
INTRODUCTION
China’s launch of its first human space flight mission
in 2003 has raised concerns about the U.S. ability to
maintain its lead in space technology. In recent years,
China has made important progress across a broad
range of space technologies including launchers,
launch schedules, satellites, and human space flight. It
established a robust remote sensing network consisting
of meteorological, land resources, and oceanography
satellites, as well as a satellite navigation and positioning
system. China also conducted more launches and more
complex launches than at any other time in its history.
It has developed a solid-fuel launcher for small and
micro-satellites, signed agreements to export satellites,
and taken a leading role in regional space cooperation.
While China has started from a low base, it has laid a
foundation to become a major space power.
The United States, on the other hand, maintains
the world’s most advanced and largest space
program. Most of the world’s commercial satellites are
manufactured by U.S. companies, it conducts the most
space exploration activities, and spends as much on
national-security space activities as all other countries
combined.1 In recent years, the United States announced
plans to return humans to the moon. But much of the
space program has encountered difficulties, including
the fatal break up of the space shuttle Columbia and
systemic problems affecting its national security space
program. Every next generation U.S. satellite being
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developed ran over budget and behind schedule and
experienced technical difficulties.2 In contrast to the
Chinese program, the United States appeared to be
losing its edge in space technology.
This monograph examines how the United States
should respond to China’s rise as a major space power
based on China’s space activities during the period of
the Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001-05). For the purposes
of this monograph, space power is defined as “the
pursuit of national objectives through the medium
of space and the use of space capabilities.”3 The
monograph will first outline China’s space goals and
then examine its activities during this period as well
as discuss China’s goals for the Eleventh 5-year Plan
(2006-10). It will then determine how the space program
contributes to China’s goal of becoming a major power
through the application of comprehensive national
power (CNP) and draw implications for U.S. national
security. Finally, it will examine possible U.S. military,
economic, and diplomatic responses to China’s space
program.
The monograph finds that over the long term,
China’s rise as a space power will present military,
economic, and political challenges to the United States.
Uncertainty over China’s pathway to potential major
power status, the possibility of a conflict over Taiwan,
and the inherent dual-use nature of space technologies
means that China’s improving space capabilities could
be used against the U.S. military. China’s efforts to
develop its space program to transform itself into an
economically and technologically powerful country
may also come at the expense of U.S. leadership in both
absolute and relative terms. Finally, with the exception
of its anti-satellite (ASAT) test in January 2007, China
has been able to use its space program to further its
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diplomatic objectives and to increase its influence in
the developing world and among second-tier space
powers, which could diminish U.S. power in the space
diplomacy arena.
China’s increasingly capable space program
will have a net negative-sum effect on the United
States and requires both domestic and international
responses by the United States. Domestically, the
U.S. Government and industry must improve the
health of its space industry through better program
management, attracting and retaining a competent
workforce, and increasing funding to develop cutting
edge technologies. Internationally, the United States
must take into account China’s growing presence in
world affairs, including space activities. While the
inherently military nature of China’s space program
and its lack of transparency preclude most forms
of cooperation, the United States can cooperate
with China in beneficial ways that do not transfer
technology or expertise. These include coordinating
scientific research and increasing the safety of human
spaceflight by establishing a code of conduct to rescue
imperiled astronauts. Consequently, the challenge for
the United States is to manage the positive-sum and
negative-sum consequences of China’s ascendant
space program by improving its space industry, better
enabling its military to counter space-based threats,
and engaging in cooperative activities that improve
science and increase the safety of human space flight.
GOALS
China’s space program, as well as its entire
economy, is guided by a series of economic policy
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decisions generated every 5 years. Appropriately called
“Five-year Plans,” these documents outline specific
industrial goals spanning every sector of the Chinese
economy from agriculture, to steel, to semiconductors.
At the time of writing, China is in its Eleventh Fiveyear Plan, which governs the period from 2006-10. The
Tenth Five-year Plan, the subject of this monograph,
covers the period from 2001-05.
In November 2001 the China National Space
Administration (CNSA) published its Tenth Fiveyear Plan, of which only elements have been publicly
released. China committed to spend more than 5
billion yuan (~$603.9 million) on the research and
development of civil space technology. According to
Luan Enjie, then head of the China National Space
Agency (NSA), China’s broad goals for the Tenth Fiveyear Plan included:
• Establishing a varied remote sensing system
that has long-term stability and an integrated
space-ground application system.
• Setting up a preliminary satellite navigation and
positioning system application industry.
• Establishing a satellite communications system
that can basically meet domestic market needs.
• Strengthening the capability to provide
commercial launch services.
• Carrying out space science research and deep
space research by beginning to research the
moon.
• Striving to be a major power in space research.
• Launching nearly 30 satellites.
• Developing small satellites.
• Carrying out human space flight.
• Striving to be a major power in space research.4
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Specifically, China planned to develop eight new
civil satellites. These included one Haiyang ocean
monitoring satellite, two Fengyun-3 meteorological
satellites, two earth-space science satellites, and three
environmental and disaster monitoring satellites.
China would improve its communication satellites for
both military and civilian use by developing Ku and C
band communications technology comparable to world
technology levels. China also planned to upgrade its
satellite navigation system, though no specifics were
given.5 In addition, China was to develop a small
satellite, a new generation of launch vehicles, as well
as lunar exploration technologies.6
TENTH FIVE-YEAR PLAN ACCOMPLISHMENTS
Space Launches.
China launched a total of 28 satellites and spacecraft
on 26 launchers for a 100 percent success rate for nontest
launches. Launches steadily increased from just one in
2001 to a peak of eight in 2004. See Table 1.
Year

Satellites Spacecraft

Total

Launches

Failures

2001

0

1

1

1

0

2002

3

2

5

5

0

2003

6

1

7

7

0

2004

10

-

10

8

0

2005

4

1

5

5

0

Totals

23

5

28

26

0

Table 1. Total Chinese Nontest Space Launches,
2001-05.
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2001. The year 2001 was a low point for the Chinese
launch industry, with a single launch of the unmanned
space capsule Shenzhou-2 in January.
2002. During 2002, China launched five spacecraft
on five rockets. Most notably, China launched two
unmanned Shenzhou capsules in March and December.
In May China launched two satellites—a Fengyun1D meteorological satellite and a Haiyang-1 ocean
monitoring satellite—into orbit on a Long March-4B
(LM-4B). In addition, the first test launch of the Pioneer-1
solid-fuel rocket was conducted in September, though
unsuccessfully. Later that month, it was announced
that China had a total of nine satellites in orbit, the
most for China at any one time up to that point.7
2003. In 2003, China announced it would launch
eight domestic satellites and one spacecraft.8 China,
however, managed launching just six satellites and
one spacecraft. Most notably, China conducted its first
human space flight mission on October 15. China also
launched its second Beidou navigation and positioning
satellite in this year. In September, a second Pioneer-1
rocket was launched, this time successfully. Five of
the launches for 2003 occurred during a 3 1/2-month
window from October 15 to December 30. These
launches were conducted from three different launch
sites with all unmanned missions being controlled
from Xi’an and with each launch requiring different
software and control teams.9
2004. Because of the many strides made in space
technology, 2004 has been called the year of “the four
mosts.” In 2004, China launched 10 satellites upon
eight rockets, all of them government launches. This
was the most launches conducted in a year by China,
demonstrating an increased ability to maintain a
regular operational tempo in terms of launch and
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satellite control. At the beginning of 2005, China had
19 satellites in orbit.
Contributing to the impressiveness of these
accomplishments was the conduct of seven of the
eight launches during a 4-month period between July
25 and November 18. The Long March-2C (LM-2C)
rocket also distinguished itself with the unprecedented
accomplishment of launching five times from three
different launch sites and carrying six satellites into
orbit in 1 year.
The fourth accomplishment of 2004 was the
reduction of launch preparation times from 45 days to
23 days. Preparation time for satellites at the launch
site was also reduced.
Other highlights for this year included the launch
of a Ziyuan-2 environmental monitoring satellite to
form a three-satellite network for more timely earth
observation. In addition, the launch of two recoverable
satellites in August and September demonstrated an
ability to quickly launch satellites from the same launch
site. The 19th recoverable satellite was launched from
the Jiuquan Launch Center on August 29 and remained
in operation for 27 days, returning on September 25.
Two days later, the 20th recoverable satellite was
launched from the Jiuquan Launch Center.10
2005. In 2005, China conducted just five launches
by orbiting one spacecraft and four satellites. China
launched the Shenzhou-6—its second human space
flight mission—this time with two astronauts. Other
notable launches include two recoverable satellites on
August 2 (FSW-21) and August 29 (FSW-22) from the
Jiuquan Launch Center. The FSW-21 mission returned
on August 29, the same day the FSW-22 was launched.
Not only did the missions prove China could launch
two missions from the same launch center in a short
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period of time, but also that command and control
teams can work continuously in maintaining a mission
while preparing for a second mission. The launch of the
Apstar-6 satellite on a LM-3B on April 12 was the first
time in 6 years China launched a commercial satellite.
Launch Vehicles.
China formally began researching and developing
its next generation launchers on May 10, 2001.11
This new family of launch vehicles offers increased
reliability and adaptability and will be powered by
“nonpoisonous” and “nonpolluting” engines that will
provide more thrust than the current generation of
launch vehicles.
These new launchers will, in part, support China’s
human space flight and lunar exploration programs by
launching a space station into Earth orbit and satellites
to the moon. The new generation of rockets will be
divided into light, medium, and heavy-lift versions
and will be able to send a 1.5 to 25 ton payload into
low-Earth orbit (LEO)12 and a 1.5 to 14 ton payload into
geosynchronous orbit (GEO).13
The first launch of the new rocket is uncertain.
CNSA Vice Administrator Luo Ge in April 2006 stated
the launch would occur by 2011.14 More recently, Huang
Chunping, the former head of the manned spaceflight
launch vehicle system, gave a launch date of 2014 or
2015.15
In addition to developing a next generation launch
vehicle, China completed the development of a smaller
solid fuel rocket, called the Pioneer (kaituozhe), designed
to launch micro and small satellites and to provide a
capability to “rapidly enter space.” Though advertised
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as built for the commercial small satellite launch vehicle
market, an article in Aerospace China lists the Pioneer’s
benefits as “stressing low cost design and a variety of
users, it is able to meet the special needs of the military
for launching small payloads.”16 Indeed, it is the KT-1
that is believed to have been used to conduct China’s
ASAT test on January 11, 2007.
The Pioneer has two variants. The KT-1 is a four-stage
booster based on the military DF-21 and is designed
to launch satellites weighing less than 100 kilograms
into orbit. Its sister launcher, the KT-2, is based on the
DF-31 intercontinental ballistic missile and can lift up
to three 100 kg payloads or one 400 kg payload. Both
variants are road-mobile.17 The first test of the KT-1
was in September 2002 and was unsuccessful,18 but a
second KT-1 was successfully launched in September
2003.19
Satellites.
China made steady progress in satellite development during the Tenth Five-year Plan. China now has
three different types of remote sensing satellites—
meteorological, ocean, and earth resources—in orbit on
a continuous basis. These systems are able to provide
different types of information to monitor weather and
disasters. China has also established its first satellite
navigation and positioning system.
Fengyun. China’s first Fengyun (FY)-class meteorological satellite was launched in 1988. China has two
series of Fengyun satellites, the FY-1 and FY-2, two of
which were launched during the Tenth Five-year Plan.
The Fengyun-2 (FY-2) is similar to the Fengyun-1 but
with improved sensors.20 The FY-2 has a service life of
3 years21 and can normally take 28 images per day.22
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China is currently developing a FY-3. Chinese
press reports boast that it will reach higher technical
standards than the U.S. NOAA-15 satellite—a spacecraft
launched in 1998.23 A People’s Daily article from 2002
states that China planned to launch two FY-3s by the
end of 2008.24 By November 2007, however, no launch
had occurred.
Ziyuan. The Ziyuan earth monitoring satellite is
a joint project with Brazil, in which China has a 70
percent stake.25 China launched three Ziyuan satellites
from 2002-04, which formed a network to provide
timely coverage of the Earth.
Ziyuan satellites have included a 20-meter resolution
optical imager, and 80-meter and 160-meter resolution
infrared sensors. It also has two wide band imagers
with a resolution of 256 meters.26 The ZY-2 is reported
to have an imager with a resolution of three meters.27
Haiyang. Development of the Haiyang-1 (HY-1)
was a goal of China’s Ninth Five-year Plan and is
China’s first ocean monitoring satellite. The satellite
will observe the characteristics of seawater, including
chlorophyll density, sea surface temperature,
suspended sand content, yellow materials, and
maritime contamination.28
The first Haiyang was launched on May 15, 2002 and
cost 200 million yuan (~$24.2 million) to manufacture.29
The satellite is a small satellite, weighing only 360
kilograms.30 The HY-1 has a color scanner with a 1,100meter resolution. It has two infrared sensors, eight
visible light sensors, and an imager with a 250-meter
resolution.31
Beidou. The Beidou satellite system is China’s regional
satellite navigation and positioning system. After the
launch of the first two Beidou satellites on October
31 and December 21, 2000, China was said to have
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established its own satellite navigation and positioning
system to be used primarily for road, rail, and ocean
traffic. The third Beidou satellite was launched on May
25, 2003. Despite these successes, Chinese officials
describe Beidou as a preliminary system that is unable
to meet China’s future needs.
Beidou is based on a system called radio
determination satellite service (RDSS) involving at
least two satellites in geostationary orbit, at least one
ground station, and customer receiver/transmitters
which communicate with each other. This system can
achieve accuracies up to 20 meters. While the Beidou
system cannot achieve the accuracies of the U.S. global
positioning system (GPS), it does have the advantage of
allowing two-way communication between the signal
provider and the customer and can be used in vehicle
location systems that can provide anti-theft and engine
monitoring services. Beidou will eventually be replaced
by a system similar to the U.S. GPS that will be free of
charge.32
Communication Satellites. China launched two
communication satellites during the Tenth Fiveyear Plan, the Chinasat-22 in November 2003 and the
Apstar 6 manufactured by Alcatel in April 2005. The
Apstar 6 is advertised as providing enhanced reception
quality over an area extending from India and China to
Australia.33
China boasted that the orbiting of the Apstar 6 was
its first commercial launch in 6 years. The significance
of this event is somewhat less than advertised,
however. The Apstar 6 is owned by APT Satellite
Holdings, a Bermuda-registered corporation with
its principal office in Hong Kong. While technically
a commercial launch, the principal ownership of the
company by Chinese government entities most likely

11

dictated the use of Chinese launch services. APT
Satellite Holdings’ principal shareholders include the
China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation
(CASC) and the China Telecommunications Broadcast
Satellite Corporation (Chinasat), both Chinese state
owned enterprises. Another principal shareholder,
CASIL Satellite Holdings Limited, is a publicly owned
subsidiary of CASC that is listed on the Hong Kong
stock exchange.34
China also made progress in improving its ground
segment for communication satellites. By the end of
2005, China had more than 80 international and domestic
telecommunications and broadcasting stations and 34
satellite broadcasting and TV link stations.35
Moreover, in 2005, China completed its “Village
Television Broadcast Project,” a program aimed at
bringing television to more than 100,000 villages
located in remote areas of Western China. China also
surpassed its goal of expanding phone service in rural
areas, with 98 percent of administrative villages now
having phone service.36
Human Space Flight.
China’s human space flight program is the space
industry’s most difficult and largest mission.37 China
conducted five launches of the Shenzhou during the
Tenth Five-year Plan, two of which were manned. On
October 15, 2003, China launched its first astronaut
into space on the Shenzhou 5. This mission lasted less
than 24 hours but proved that China was capable of
safely sending a human into orbit and returning him to
Earth. China’s second manned space flight occurred on
October 12, 2005, and lasted 5 days, with a crew of two.
China’s human space flight program can be expected
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to increase in difficulty and is planned to eventually
result in a permanently-manned space station.
Space Science.
Lunar Program. China’s lunar program was
officially announced in January 2003, but planning
for the endeavor had been going on for years.38 The
first stage occurred in 2007 and involved sending a
satellite to take three-dimensional images of the moon.
Eventually China wants to land a robotic vehicle on
the moon much in the same way as the United States
landed a robotic vehicle on Mars.
Double Star. The Double Star satellite project
is the result of an agreement signed on July 9, 2001,
between the China NSA and the European Space
Agency (ESA) to research the effects of the Sun on
the Earth’s environment.39 China’s two satellites have
joined the four ESA satellites of the Cluster project to
form a monitoring network. The first launch occurred
on December 30, 2003, and the second satellite was
launched on July 25, 2004.40
Satellite Export.
China announced agreements in 2004 and 2005
to export its first satellites. A contract was signed in
December 2004 between the Nigerian government and
the China Great Wall Corporation for China to build
and launch the satellite, provide operating services,
and train Nigerian technicians in its operation.41 The
Nigerian Communication Satellite is based on the
Dongfanghong-4 communication satellite and was
launched on May 14, 2007. China also signed a similar
agreement with Venezuela for a telecommunications
satellite to be launched in 2008.42
13

Cooperation.
China took steps to take a leading role in regional
space cooperation during the Tenth Five-year Plan.
In October 2005, China, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iran,
Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru, and Thailand endorsed
the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization
convention to promote multilateral cooperation in
space science, technology, and applications and agreed
to headquarter the organization in Beijing. Since then,
Turkey also signed the convention. China submitted
the convention to its legislature in June 2006, which
will take effect when the legislatures of at least five
signatories approve membership.43
China has also increased its cooperation with the
ESA. In 2004, ESA and the National Remote Sensing
Centre of China (NRSCC), an entity under the
Ministry of Science and Technology, began a 3-year
earth observation program called “Dragon.” The
Dragon program focuses on science and applications
development in China mainly using data from ESA’s
Earth Remote Sensing (ERS)-2 and Envisat missions.
The objectives of this cooperation are to promote the
use of ESA data from the ERS and Envisat satellites,
to stimulate Earth observation science, to publish
coauthored research results, and to provide training
in processing, algorithm, and product development
from ESA earth observation data of land, ocean, and
atmospheric conditions.44
While developing its own indigenous satellite
navigation and positioning system, China agreed in
2003 to invest 200 million Euro in the Galileo satellite
navigation and positioning system. According to
this agreement, China will invest 70 million Euro in
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space technologies and 130 million Euro on ground
infrastructure and applications. Since then, China’s
participation in Galileo has been reduced. The political
rationale pushed by Brussels for cooperating with the
Chinese, a major factor driving the agreement, lost
steam after the Dutch and French rejected the European
constitution in 2005 and industry advocates used the
opportunity to voice concerns over the agreement.
European businesses wanted to cut China out of the
market by developing as much of the technology as
possible themselves. The aerospace industry also had
reservations that U.S. export controls may not permit
them to use critical U.S. technologies in Galileo due to
the possibility of their diversion to China.
Due to these concerns, China will continue to invest
in domestic ground infrastructure and applications but
will minimize the development of technologies for the
space segment. In accordance with this, China will set
up a center at Beijing University in cooperation with
the ESA, the European Commission, and the Chinese
Ministry of Science and Technology, called the ChinaEurope Global Navigation Satellite System Technical
Training and Cooperation Center. This organization
will facilitate joint ventures between Chinese and
European companies involved in the research and
development of satellite navigation and positioning
products.45
While China’s cooperation with Europe has been
diminished, its cooperation with Russia is increasing. In
September 2005, the head of the Russian Federal Space
Agency stated that cooperation with China reached
a “fundamentally new level” with 29 new projects
added to the cooperation program for 2004-06. Exact
details remain unknown, but in 2006 Russia and China
announced a joint Mars exploration mission to land a
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robotic explorer on the red planet and then return it to
earth.46 Cooperation on a lunar program and satellite
communications has also been discussed.47
ASSESSMENT
The period of the Tenth Five-year Plan occasioned
a significant improvement in all aspects of China’s
space program. For example, during the previous
Five-year Plan, China allocated just 1.7 billion yuan
(~$205.3 million) to civilian space activities—less than
half the 5 billion yuan (~$603.9 million) budgeted for
the Tenth Five-year Plan. China’s 26 launches during
this 5-year period are nearly half the total number of
successful launches (54) conducted before 2001. China
also launched two new types of spacecraft: the Shenzhou
manned spacecraft and the Haiyang oceanographic
satellites, and existing satellite classes underwent
improvement.
While the Chinese space program made impressive
gains during the Tenth Five-year Plan, when compared
with the other major space powers, China’s space
technology still lags behind. Taking imagery satellites
as an example, China’s Ziyuan satellite has just a threemeter resolution and remains behind even commercial
remote sensing technology resolutions. Commercial
remote sensing provider Geoeye, for example, offers
one-meter imagery and plans to offer 0.41-meter
imagery. Similarly, the Beidou satellite navigation and
positioning system is a regional system that offers
accuracies to 20 meters. The U.S. GPS constellation, on
the other hand, offers a global service with accuracies
of several meters.
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Rocket
Rate

Capabilities

Total
Launches

Failed
Launches

Success
Percentage

LM-1

LEO

2

0

100

LM-2

LEO

1

1

0

LM-2C*

LEO

28

0

100

LM-2D*

LEO

6

0

100

LM-2E*

LEO/GEO

7

2

71

LM-2F**

LEO

6

0

100

LM-3

GEO

13

3

77

LM-3A*

GEO

8

0

100

LM-3B*

GEO

7

1

86

LM-4B*

LEO/GEO

10

0

100

88

7

92

Total

*Marketed to international customers
**Dedicated for Shenzhou missions
Table 2. Long March Family Success Rates.
China’s progress in launchers and launches is
also mixed when compared to the other major space
powers. China successfully launched all of its Long
March boosters during the Tenth Five-year Plan. The
last launch of 2005, which orbited Shenzhou 6, was
the 46th straight successful launch of the Long March
series. The Long March booster reached a 92 percent
success rate based on 88 launches, a figure approaching
international standards. The success rates of the Long
March family vary widely depending on launcher,
however. The LM-2C continues to be a solid work horse
with no failures and 28 launches by mainly launching
China’s recoverable satellites. The LM-3, on the other
hand, has just a 77 percent success rate.48
As a result, while the success rate of the Long
March family as a whole may approach international
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levels, certain launchers are still far from reaching
these standards. (See Table 2.) Because of this, the
Great Wall Industry Corporation, the commercial
representative for the China Aerospace Science and
Technology Corporation, only markets the LM-2C,
LM-2D, LM-2E, LM-3A, LM-3B, and LM-4B boosters to
international customers. While the LM-2E and LM-3B
have below average success rates (71 percent and 86
percent, respectively), the other four launchers have a
100 percent success rate. It is probable that these two
launchers will not achieve international success rates
before the next generation of launchers is introduced.
China also does not appear to have the capability
to match the launch tempos of the major space powers.
(See Table 3.) While China has shown a capability to
surge launches, this capability does not compare to the
launch rates of Russia and the United States. In fact,
examination of the number of launches reveals a huge
gap between China and the United States and Russia.
Its proximity to the number of European launches,
however, reflects just how close China is to being on
par with that major space power.
Year

Russia

United States

Europe

China

2005

26

12

5

5

2004

22

16

3

8

2003

21

23

4

6

2002

25

17

12

6

2001

23

22

8

1

Totals

117

90

32

26

Table 3. Total Space Launches of Major Space
Powers, 2001-05.
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China’s development of launch vehicles also lags
behind the United States and Europe. Development
of China’s next generation launch vehicle, originally
scheduled to take 10 years, may now take 15 years.
In contrast, development of the U.S. Atlas V and Delta
IV launchers took approximately 8 years, while the
European Ariane 5 took approximately 11 years.
The only area in which the Chinese have reached
international standards is its human spaceflight
program. While the United States may operate the
more advanced space shuttle, it has recognized the
practicality of space capsules for human spaceflight and
its next generation of manned spacecraft will adopt the
technologies used during the Apollo missions. In this
respect, by adopting a “Back to the Future” concept
for its Shenzhou program, the Chinese are ahead of the
United States in manned spaceflight technology.
THE FUTURE49
China plans to build on its successes in the Tenth
Five-year Plan in the coming years. According to the
Commission on Science, Technology, and Industry for
National Defense (COSTIND), there are six main space
science projects for the Eleventh Five-year Plan:
• Human space flight. This includes increasing the
complexity of its human space flight missions
with a space walk scheduled for the Shenzhou-7
mission in 2008 and docking missions.
• Lunar exploration. The first stage of the lunar
mission to send a lunar orbiter to take three-dimensional images of the moon was successfully
conducted in 2007. The second stage, landing
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a lunar rover on the moon surface to conduct
robotic exploration, is scheduled to launch
in 2012. The third stage involving a lunar soil
return mission is scheduled to be launched by
2020.
• Space science.
		 — Indigenously develop a hard x-ray
modulating telescope to study black holes
to be launched in 2010.
		 — Launch the Shijian-10 recoverable satellite
in 2009 to carry out microgravity space
biomedicine experiments.
		 — Develop a solar telescope to study solar
physics.
		 — Develop technologies for a three-satellite
constellation called Kua Fu to study solar
activity that will consist of one satellite to
monitor solar activity and two others to
study the aurora.
• International cooperation. Participate in the
Sino-Russian Mars environment exploration
plan, the World Space Observatory Ultraviolet
Project,50 and the Sino-French Small Satellite
Solar Flare Exploration Project.51
In addition, space cooperation will be advanced by the
formal establishment of the Convention on Asia-Pacific
Space Cooperation Organization and the publication
of a second space white paper.52
In regards to imaging satellites, China will launch
18 remote sensing satellites; these include earth
resources, environmental disaster, meteorological,
and oceanographic satellites. These remote sensing
satellites are “to form an all-weather, 24-hour, multispectral, differential-resolution Earth observation for
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stable operation, and achieve stereoscopy and dynamic
monitoring of the land, atmosphere, and sea.”53 This
will include establishing an environmental and
disaster monitoring satellite constellation consisting of
four synthetic aperture radar (SAR) and four optical
satellites. The first three satellites will be launched in
2007 and will include two optical and one SAR satellite.
Another five satellites will be launched in 2010.54
China also plans to spend $1.5 billion to develop
meteorological satellites, including launching the
FY-2 with a 1.25 kilometer visible and a five kilometer
infrared resolution imager; and the FY-3 with infrared,
spectrometer, and microwave imagers; a medium
resolution imager; radiometer; and a scanning
radiometer. It will also develop the FY-4, which will
include improved meteorological measurements and
one to five kilometer resolution imagers.
In addition to its meteorological satellites, China
launched the HY-1B oceanography satellite in 2007.
This satellite is equipped with a 250-meter resolution
imager and an ocean color spectrum scanner with
a 1,100 meter resolution. In 2009, China will launch
the HY-2 to monitor ocean waves, ocean wind field,
ocean gravity field, ocean currents, and ocean surface
temperatures. It will be fitted with a microwave
radiometer, microwave spectrometer, and radar
altimeter.
A main focus for the Chinese space industry during
the Eleventh Five-year Plan will be the development
and launch of communication satellites. Multiple large
communication satellites having a service life of 15
years and weighing 5,200 kilograms will be launched
beginning in 2006.
The Eleventh Five-year Plan thus promises to
further China’s progress in space technology with
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breakthroughs in synthetic aperture radar technology,
allowing China to image objects regardless of
weather; human spaceflight capabilities allowing
for extravehicular activity that will give China the
experience necessary to maintain space stations; and
continued space weather missions that will provide
additional knowledge to protect astronauts from solar
activity.
THE BENEFITS OF A SPACE PROGRAM:
FITTING SPACE POWER INTO CHINA’S GRAND
STRATEGY
China’s burgeoning space program provides
opportunities for China to use the benefits derived from
space power to become a more influential and respected
nation. The trappings of a robust space program are
one hallmark of the great powers and China appears
to be positioning itself as a great power with its space
program. Indeed, as a COSTIND press release on its
Eleventh Five-year Plan for space science states, “Our
country is one of the few major space powers. China’s
position in the world and the country’s security
depend on the continued fast development of space
technology.”55 This sentiment would be in accordance
with some Chinese analysts who have advocated that
China adopt a great power mentality in which China’s
interests mirror those of the major powers.56 While there
is no official Chinese “grand strategy,” the Chinese
leadership appears to have reached a consensus on the
goals of China’s foreign policy and how it should go
about achieving them.57 According to Avery Goldstein,
China’s grand strategy:
aims to engineer China’s rise to great power status within
the constraints of a unipolar international system that
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the United States dominates. It is designed to sustain the
conditions necessary for continuing China’s program
of economic and military modernization as well as to
minimize the risk that others, most importantly the
peerless United States, will view the ongoing increase in
China’s capabilities as an unacceptably dangerous threat
that must be parried or perhaps even forestalled. China’s
grand strategy, in short, aims to increase the country’s
international clout without triggering a counterbalancing
reaction.58

Similarly, Dr. Evan Medeiros writes that China’s
foreign policy goals are to “[maximize] its influence,
leverage, and freedom of action while pursuing
economic development to facilitate its reemergence as
a great power.”59 China is implementing this strategy
by establishing partnerships with other major powers
in order to make China an attractive or indispensable
actor whose interests must be taken into account.
The second component of this strategy is an activist
international agenda “designed to establish China’s
reputation as a responsible member of the international
community and mute widespread concerns about how
Beijing is likely to employ its growing capabilities,
thus reducing the incentives for others to unite in
opposition to China.”60 This strategy is also designed to
protect China’s core national interests against external
threats as well as to shape the international system in
which it operates. In addition, China’s activities are
to help usher in a multipolar world in which China
would be one of several great powers.61 In the short
term, however, China’s foreign policy is concentrated
on developing national capabilities and international
partners while avoiding the provocative consequences
of a more straightforward hegemonic or balancing
strategy.62 This section examines the benefits of space
power China uses to pursue these goals.
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Space Power’s Contribution to China’s
Comprehensive National Power.
China’s space program furthers its grand strategy
ambitions by adding to China’s comprehensive
national power (CNP). Comprehensive national power
is defined as the sum of a nation’s economic, political,
military, scientific and technological, educational,
and cultural strength. CNP can be divided into hard
power, such as military force, and soft power, such as
economic and cultural influence. While space power is
not a main contributor to China’s CNP, it nevertheless
is considered an important component. Space activities
increase China’s hard power by improving China’s
military capability and increase its soft power through
its economic and political benefits.
China’s grand strategy is reflected in its pursuit
of space power. China’s space program is intended
to portray China as a modernizing nation that is
committed to the peaceful uses of space while at the
same time serving China’s political, economic, and
military interests. It contributes to China’s overall
influence and provides capabilities that give China more
freedom of action and opportunities for international
leadership. With the exception of its ASAT test in
January 2007, China has been able to conduct many of
these activities without directly challenging the United
States in space. Indeed, despite the dual-use nature
of space technology, China is loathe to mention the
military utility of it space program. China’s progress
in space technologies, however, has many negativesum aspects for the United States which may lead to
confrontation or competition in space.
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Military Benefits. The People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) is undergoing reforms to transform itself into a
military that is increasingly reliant on information for
winning wars. According to China’s 2006 defense white
paper, “informationization” will be the driving force
for PLA modernization as well as its major criterion.
Moreover, the white paper states that the “PLA pursues
a strategy of strengthening itself by means of science
and technology, and works to accelerate change in
the generating mode of war fighting capabilities by
drawing on scientific and technological advances.”
Indeed, information superiority is now seen
by the PLA as a primary component for winning
future wars.63 The side which can better collect and
process information will be better able to detect and
exploit battlefield opportunities and counter enemy
movements. In analyzing U.S. military operations, PLA
writers recognize the role space plays in the collection
and transmittal of information. Remote sensing
satellites can provide intelligence on the disposition of
enemy forces and provide strategic intelligence before
a conflict begins. Communication satellites can provide
global connectivity and can facilitate communications
for forces landing on the island of Taiwan. Navigation
and positioning satellites can provide critical
information on location and can improve the accuracy
of munitions.
In fact, Chinese writers often assert that control
of space is a prerequisite for control of the terrestrial
domains.64 According to one source:
Space power improves battlefield awareness capabilities, strengthens joint operations systems, improves precision strike capabilities, and increasingly strengthens
overall battlefield superiority. Integrated joint operations increasingly rely on space power and space is the
high point of informationized warfare.65
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Chinese military authors are also placing increasing
emphasis on the use of space. In the past, PLA authors
acknowledged that its information systems were
incapable of enabling it to act more quickly than the
U.S. military and their writings focused more on
denying space to potential adversaries. However, as the
PLA begins to contemplate using space, it recognizes
that it must not only deny the use of information to
its opponents but also use space to facilitate its own
operations. One source, for example, asserts that
“traditional” information collection means cannot
meet the requirements of modern war and states that
“the collection of targeting information over a wide
expanse of territory, the monitoring of the battlefield
disposition, and battle damage assessments cannot be
separated from space forces for the collection of timely
battlefield information.”66
The establishment of a network of Ziyuan satellites
is the first step in maintaining a system for this
purpose. Moreover, improved imagery resolutions
will make it more difficult for the U.S. military to hide
its intentions. The improved resolution of the satellite
from 20 meters to three meters will permit the Chinese
to more accurately collect intelligence, monitor targets,
and conduct battle damage assessments. This increase
in resolution will enable China to image aircraft,
distinguish between warships and commercial ships,
and locate clusters of vehicles—all crucial to gaining
tactical battlefield intelligence and capabilities they
lacked until recently. The addition of SAR satellites in
the coming years will increase China’s reconnaissance
abilities by allowing it to image at night and during
inclement weather.
The establishment of meteorological satellites and
ocean observation satellites will provide China with a
26

network of satellites to monitor the weather, provide
more timely weather forecasts, and allow more time
to prepare for severe weather. These satellites may
be especially important during typhoon season
when operations would need to be planned around
inclement weather. The importance of accurate weather
forecasting cannot be underestimated. The invasion
of Normandy in World War II was delayed due to
inclement weather, and more recently sand storms
during the 2003 invasion of Iraq hampered close air
support operations.
China’s Beidou navigation satellite system also has
the potential to assist military operations. Because
its relative inaccuracy (20 meters) minimizes its use
for precision guided munitions, this system appears
to be primarily for assisting logistics units with the
transportation of supplies. One study, however, argues
that the system could improve the accuracy of China’s
ballistic missiles to 500 meters.67 Currently, Chinese
ballistic missiles primarily use inertial navigation
systems, though some also use GPS guidance.68
Launchers. Chinese launch activity during the
Tenth Five-year Plan can also help facilitate military
operations. Chinese launch tempo was more active
during this time period than at any other time in its
history. Chinese launches were clustered during launch
windows of several months, demonstrating an ability
to surge launches before a conflict or replace satellites
lost to enemy action. Particularly interesting have
been the consecutive launches of recoverable satellites
from the same launch base to provide continuous
reconnaissance capability. In addition, a more robust
launch tempo can be used offensively to launch
repeated ASAT attacks against adversary satellites.
The introduction of the Pioneer-1 solid fuel rocket,
ostensibly to serve the micro and small satellite market,
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also enables China to surge a large number of satellites
into orbit during a short period of time. Not only
could this rocket supplement China’s communication
and remote sensing needs, it could also be used to
launch ASAT satellites into orbit or provide a direct
ascent ASAT capability. Indeed, many observers
have speculated that the January 2007 ASAT test was
conducted using the Pioneer-1.
Because Pioneer rockets are presumably based on
road-mobile military variants, China could potentially
launch satellites or ASAT weapons into orbit even if
its three launch bases were destroyed.69 Locating these
launchers would be difficult, and they thus potentially
provide China with a persistent ASAT and satellite
launch capability.
Economic Benefits. China has embraced its space
program as a driver for economic and technological
advancement. China’s 2006 white paper states: “Since
the space industry is an important part of the national
overall development strategy, China will maintain
long term, steady development in this field.”
China’s support for its space program lies in its
potential to spark innovation. Innovation has been
identified as a key factor for economic growth, yet much
of China’s growth has come through increasing inputs
rather than through productivity gains. Moreover,
much of China’s technological advancement has come
through the importation of foreign technology. As
James Kynge writes in China Shakes the World, China’s
technological advancement “is driven not so much
by research as by commerce. Chinese companies, by
and large, derive their technologies by buying them,
copying them, or encouraging a foreign partner to
transfer them as part of the price of access to a large
potential market.”70 A report by the RAND Corporation
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notes that the most profitable defense industries,
information technology, and shipbuilding are also the
ones that have the most access to foreign technology.71
China’s space industry hopes to not only follow in the
footsteps of these industries, but also achieve success
by indigenously developing technologies that not only
spur development within the industry but also have
spillover effects for the entire economy.
Despite these hopes, the Chinese government
acknowledges that it still has far to go. The vice chair
of the Chinese Association for Science and Technology
has acknowledged that China’s space technology is
still in an experimental stage.72 The space industry
is still too immature to make large contributions to
China’s economic development and makes up less
than 1 percent of China’s gross domestic product
(GDP). China’s space technology is also recognized as
still developing while other industries in China rely on
mature technology. Because of this, the space industry
has not been able to realize the spin-off benefits other
industries have experienced since Chinese companies
favor foreign technologies over domestically produced
technologies. Given these challenges, the space industry
is expected to have difficulty making a meaningful
impact on China’s economy in the near term.73
Nevertheless, a foundation has been laid for
the space program to benefit other sectors of the
economy. In regards to human capital, China’s
space industry keeps large numbers of engineers
employed and motivates others to become involved
in high technology fields. The Beijing University of
Aeronautics and Astronautics (BUAA), for example,
has 23,000 students, about one-third of them directly
involved in aerospace. In 2001, space-related research
and educational programs at BUAA were reported to
have increased by 20 percent.74
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The training of so many highly skilled workers can
also benefit the entire economy. It is possible that some
of these engineers either directly after graduation or
later in their careers may be employed in non-aerospace
jobs. In fact, maintaining a large pool of aerospace
engineers and scientists presents a strategic advantage
for China and a long-term challenge for the United
States. China’s increasing number of engineers and
scientists coincides with the drop in the number of U.S.
citizens graduating with advanced technical degrees.
If these trends continue, it will become increasingly
difficult for the United States to maintain its technical
advantage.
In addition, China’s human space flight program
has instilled an emphasis on quality control needed to
safely transfer humans into orbit. These procedures
are now conducted for the entire space program and,
if effectively implemented, will increase the reliability
of China’s space technology. These new measures
include:
• Increased quality control testing and
management oversight of components;
• Adoption of mature technologies;
• Production of surplus subassemblies to provide
a better statistical base for quality checking;
• Greater redundancy;
• Modernizing assembly procedures and tooling;
• Improved standards for selecting management
personnel and increasing their training;
• A more standardized process to assess
incidents.75
The emphasis on quality control can also have spillover
effects to other industries. The lessons and experience
gained in program management and systems
engineering can be applied to other areas of China’s
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economy and enable China to increase the quality of
its products with decreasing assistance from foreign
sources.
Commercial Services. While China has established
foundations in technology, human resource
development, and systems engineering, it has also
made its first forays into the international satellite
market. China’s success in signing agreements to
export satellites represents a small, but important step
to commercialize its space industry. China’s satellite
exports are not pure commercial transactions, however,
and cannot be divorced from its diplomatic agenda.
It is no coincidence that China’s two satellite export
agreements were signed with countries with large oil
reserves—Nigeria and Venezuela. While the dollar
amount of the Venezuelan satellite is unknown, the
price of the Nigerian satellite was reportedly around
$300 million. Moreover, China was the only provider
willing to sell a satellite to Nigeria and sweetened the
deal with $200 million in preferential buyer’s credits
from the Export-Import Bank of China.76
In the short term, the commercial implications of
such deals may be limited. Both satellites are scheduled
to be launched on LM-3B boosters. As we have seen,
these launchers have a success rate of just 86 percent,
well below industry standards. In fact, it is doubtful
that China could have negotiated these deals on purely
commercial grounds without substantial discounting
to cover the risk of a failed launch. These deals may
have also required China to assume the risk of launch
failure by ensuring the satellites.
Nevertheless, China’s packaging of satellite sales,
operations, and launch services may present a new
business model. The main impediment to making the
satellite industry more cost effective is the inability
to lower launch costs. Launch costs during the 1990s
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averaged around $12,000 per pound and have only
infrequently been able to be lower than $10,000 per
pound.77 By packaging sales, operations, and launches,
the Chinese may be able to lower the overall price
by reducing costs in satellite manufacturing and
operations. In addition, by focusing on customers
who may not be able to purchase more advanced,
but more expensive western satellites, China can gain
valuable experience in the satellite market and draw
revenue that can then help them expand into other
markets. This model has been used successfully in
the telecommunications industry by companies such
as Huawei, a manufacturer of networking equipment.
Consequently, as its satellite technology and launch
rates improve, China could become competitive in the
satellite market.
Political Benefits. The Chinese government also
uses its space program for domestic and international
political gain. China’s human spaceflight and lunar
exploration missions present a peaceful image
of China’s space program and are intended to
counteract concerns over China’s use of space for
military purposes. Diplomatically, China’s expanding
international cooperation on space activities portends
a more influential foreign policy. Headquartering the
Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization in Beijing
demonstrates China’s determination to take a regional
leadership role in space.
The success of China’s program also has internal
political benefits. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
is now communist in name only, and its continued
legitimacy is predicated on delivering economic and
nationalistic benefits in an informal social contract with
its citizens: The CCP agrees to increase the standard
of living and develop China into an internationally
respected country, and the people agree not to rebel.
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By developing a robust space program and
participating in high-profile activities such as human
space flight and lunar exploration, the Communist
Party can demonstrate that it is the best provider of
material benefits to the Chinese people and the best
organization to propel China to its rightful place in
world affairs. The October 2007 launch of its lunar
orbiter, for example, received nearly continuous allday coverage on Chinese state-run television.
Anecdotal evidence appears to confirm public
support for the program. According to one National
Public Radio report, the Shenzhou program receives
widespread support among the Chinese populace.
Quoting one man, “If China wants to be powerful, we
need to be able to compete in space. It’s like having the
atom bomb. If we want to have a voice that is heard
in the world, we must have this space program.”78
Anecdotal evidence from author interviews with
Chinese shortly after the launch of the first manned
mission also indicates that the program receives
widespread support, with a number of the interlocutors
specifically stating that they were proud that the human
space flight program used indigenous technology.
Such support does not appear to be universal,
however. Statements by Chinese officials comparing
the cost of the lunar program to the cost of constructing
two kilometers of subway line in Beijing suggest efforts
to justify parts of the space program to its detractors.79
Moreover, the depth of public support for the space
program is unclear, and it is unknown to what extent
the public is willing to support space activities,
particularly if China is subjected to a national crisis or
severe economic downturn.
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THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE RISE OF CHINA’S
SPACE PROGRAM FOR U.S. INTERESTS
China’s pursuit of space power is a reflection of
its grand strategy. It has established partnerships
with the major space powers of Europe and Russia
as well as numerous smaller space powers, and it has
sought leadership positions in the international space
community, which promotes an image of China as a
responsible member of the international community. By
striving to be a major space power, China increases the
multipolarity of world politics. China’s progress in space
capabilities has also increased China’s comprehensive
national power. None of these capabilities, however,
have yet tipped the scale in China’s favor militarily,
economically, or politically. While China must be
considered a major space power in terms of number of
launches, satellites, and missions, the ability to use its
space program for military applications, and economic
and political benefit remains limited in relation to
the other major space powers. China has, however,
laid the foundation to begin using space power as an
instrument of its national power. China’s increase in
space power, whether in relative or absolute terms, has
implications for U.S. national security.
Military Interests.
A 1997 report by the U.S. National Defense Panel
called space power “an integral part of the revolution
in military affairs and a key asset in achieving military
advantage in information operations.” It asserted that
“space is the information battle’s high ground,” and
that “the United States cannot afford to lose the edge
it now holds in military-related space operations.”80
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It also warned that “greater accessibility to space by
our competitors will strongly influence the struggle for
advantage in military operations.”81
China’s improving space capabilities appear to
have negative-sum consequences for U.S. military
security and the potential for armed conflict between
the United States and China requires the United States
to prepare to confront an adversary possessing space
technologies. Chinese remote sensing satellites can
provide critical intelligence on the disposition of U.S.
forces. For example, the U.S. Defense Department
revealed in its 2006 Military Power of the People’s Republic
of China that China is researching the use of ballistic
and cruise missiles to attack aircraft carriers.82 Such a
capability would require the Chinese military to first
locate and track the aircraft carrier, most likely through
the use of space-based means. Aircraft carriers would
play a critical role in a conflict over Taiwan due to the
lack of nearby airfields, and the loss of even one carrier
could seriously degrade U.S. operations.
Commercial Interests.
A surgent Chinese space program would also appear
to have negative-sum consequences for U.S. commercial
interests, mainly due to the slow growth of key sectors
of the international space market. According to data
collected by Futron Corporation, global revenue for
members of the Satellite Industry Association grew by
63 percent between 2001 and 2005. (See Table 4.) Most
of this increase occurred in the area of satellite services,
such as satellite television and radio, which constituted
60 percent of total satellite industry revenue.

35

Year

Amount

2001

64.4

2002

71.3

2003

74.3

2004

82.7

2005

88.8

Table 4. World Satellite Industry Revenues
in Billions U.S.$.83
Other sectors did not fare so well. Global satellite
manufacturing revenues decreased from $9.5 billion
in 2001 to $7.8 billion on 2005. U.S. revenue decreased
from $3.8 billion to $3.2 billion for the same time
period. (See Table 5.) Global launch industry revenues
remained stagnant at $3 billion from 2001 to 2005,
while U.S. launch revenues increased from $1.1 billion
to $1.5 billion.84 (See Table 6.) These numbers illustrate
that while the entire satellite industry market may
have increased dramatically during the Tenth Fiveyear Plan, revenue from critical sectors such as satellite
manufacturing and launch services either decreased
or remained unchanged. Under these conditions, a
Chinese space industry that becomes more active in
international commercial activities will negatively
affect existing market players. When this may occur
is uncertain. The poor success rate of certain Chinese
launchers and China’s catering to low-end satellite
customers indicates that it could be some time before
China’s commercial space activities dramatically affect
the global market.

36

Year

World Amount

U.S. Amount

2001

9.5

3.8

2002

11.0

4.4

2003

9.8

4.6

2004

10.2

3.9

2005

7.8

3.2

Table 5. World and U.S. Satellite Manufacturing
Revenues in Billions U.S.$.
Year

World Amount

U.S. Amount

2001

3.0

1.1

2002

3.7

1.0

2003

3.2

2.1

2004

2.8

1.5

2005

3.0

1.5

Table 6. World and U.S. Launch Industry Revenues
in Billions U.S.$.
The potential over the long term of a strong
Chinese presence in the international space market,
however, may require the U.S. Government to assist
the U.S. space industry to remain competitive due to
its reliance on government contracts for the majority of
its business. The government, while a customer, must
also assume some responsibility for the health of the
industry if the United States is to maintain its lead in
space technology. According to one report, “the federal
government provided over 95 percent of funding for
basic research, 85 percent for technology development,
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and 70 percent for concept demonstration in the space
sector.”85 It also found that the United States led in 39
space technologies, was equal in 13, and lagged in three;
and that U.S. space technology was most advanced in
areas which received more government support.86
Demographic changes occurring in the aerospace
engineering profession also remain a critical challenge
for the U.S. space industry. According to the
Aerospace Industry Association, “The United States
has lost 750,000 scientific, technical, production, and
administrative workers in the past 14 years.”87 Many
aerospace professionals will also be eligible to retire. In
2005, 55 percent of the aerospace industry workforce
was over age 45, and in 2008, 25 percent of the U.S.
aerospace workforce will be eligible to retire.88 In
addition, the number of U.S. citizens graduating with
degrees in math and sciences continues to decline
and of those, many choose careers in more lucrative
fields such as computer science. One potential source
of human capital may come from other countries, but
that option is limited for military contractors whose
workers require security clearances. The result is that
the U.S. space industry may only be able to replace half
of the 57,000 to 68,000 military engineers expected to
retire by 2010.89
This is in contrast to the Chinese space program
where a large percentage of the workforce is under age
45, and where China continues to graduate increasing
numbers of students educated in math and sciences.
China is widely reported to graduate 600,000 engineers
per year while the United States graduates just 70,000.
These numbers, however, are subject to debate.
According to research done by Duke University, the
United States graduates 137,000 students with 4-year
degrees in engineering. This same research concluded
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that China actually graduates 351,000 engineers.90 Even
if China is not graduating the number of engineers once
believed, the Duke University numbers demonstrate
that China is producing more than 12 times the number
of engineers as the United States when the size of the
two countries’ economies are compared.91
U.S. demographic and educational challenges may
be exacerbated by Chinese mercantilist policies that
support the space industry, in contrast to the U.S. space
industry which is more subject to market considerations.
Indeed, the U.S. space industry is contracting at a time
when the Chinese industry is expanding. In response
to market concerns two major restructurings of the U.S.
space industry occurred in 2006. On October 11, 2006,
Lockheed Martin announced that it had:
completed the sale of its interests in Lockheed Khrunichev Energia International, Inc. (LKEI) and ILS International Launch Services, Inc. (ILS) to Space Transport
Inc. The two companies had provided sales, marketing
and mission management support for launches of both
the Lockheed Martin-built Atlas and Khrunichev-built
Proton and Angara rockets to commercial customers.92

Also in October 2006, the U.S. Federal Trade
Commission approved the merger of Lockheed
Martin’s and Boeing’s rocket manufacturing and
launch services into a joint venture called United
Launch Alliance. The merger was approved due to the
fears of the U.S. Defense Department that one of the
rocket manufacturers would drop out of the business
due to a weak launch market.93
Diplomatic Interests.
The importance of China’s space diplomacy should
not be overstated, but is nevertheless noteworthy.
39

Good relations in space do not drive good relations
on Earth. International cooperation on space activities
usually follows progress in the overall relationship
and is more of an indicator of the state of a relationship
than a critical component. It is more likely that China’s
penchant to offer aid and investment to developing
countries without conditions will increase its influence
more than cooperation on space activities.
Nevertheless, China’s space program does play
a role in advancing China’s diplomatic agenda and
China’s leadership in this area may contribute to
its overall increase in diplomatic influence. China’s
cooperative space activities present another avenue
for countries to participate in space without the United
States and increases multipolarity. The failed attempt
by China to become a major player in the Galileo
project is just one example of how attempts by China
to promote a more multipolar world can impinge on
U.S. security interests.
China’s cooperation with the European Union (EU)
and Russia also provide additional opportunities for
technology transfer. While China’s participation in
Galileo has been diminished, future activities may
result in closer cooperation between the EU and China.
The Sino-Russian cooperation on a Mars exploration
mission will certainly result in some form of technical
cooperation. Moreover, the likelihood of cooperation
with China has prompted some countries to develop
space technologies independent of the United States
in order to avoid U.S. International Traffic in Arms
Regulations (ITAR). For example, the Apstar 6 satellite
launched by China in April 2005 was Acatel’s first ITARfree satellite. Consequently, cooperation with China is
making Europe more technologically independent of
U.S. industry, which could increase competition and
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result in the loss of market share for U.S. aerospace
companies.
THE U.S. RESPONSE: CONTAIN, COMPETE,
COOPERATE, OR DO NOTHING?
The difficulty in deciding an appropriate response
to China’s rise as a major space power arises from
the inability of both sides to determine whether their
relationship will be friendly or hostile. The United
States views a more capable China as potentially
coming into conflict with its interests. China, for its
part, views the U.S. hedging strategy as possibly
thwarting its ambitions to become a major power. The
uncertainty of the U.S.-China relationship is reflected
in the rise of China’s space program, which appears to
hold more negative-sum outcomes than positive-sum
outcomes for the United States. Indeed, the focus on the
negative-sum outcomes of China’s space program and
possible U.S. responses has increased with the renewed
emphasis in both countries on human space flight and
lunar exploration. The United States is thus presented
with four policy options to meet the changing dynamics
presented by China’s space program: contain, compete,
cooperate, and do nothing.
Contain.
Containment is the least viable of the four options,
and as China becomes more integrated with the world,
it will become even less practical. As Avery Goldstein
writes, China’s grand strategy of integrating itself
into international politics and the world economy
“undermines the feasibility and desirability of a U.S.
policy of containment.”94 Nations without the security
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concerns of the United States will increasingly look
upon space as another venue for interacting with China.
China has stable and positive working relationships
with its neighbors and other major powers, and
these relationships, for the most part, are improving.
China cooperates with many nations in space and
looks to Europe in particular for access to technology
and expertise that is denied by the United States.95 It
maintains important cooperative activities with Russia
in which Russia sells technology or expertise, especially
in regards to China’s human spaceflight program. It
also maintains important cooperative relationships
with organizations based in the EU, including with
Surrey Satellite Technology, Ltd. with which China
developed two microsatellites.
China’s heading of the Asia Pacific Space
Cooperation Organization also demonstrates just
how difficult it would be to isolate China as it takes
a leadership role in international space forums. China
will benefit from international space cooperation with
or without the United States and trying to contain
China’s space cooperation with other countries, except
when U.S. interests are directly threatened as with the
Galileo project, may only undermine its position with
other space powers.
Compete.
The similarities of the two countries’ human
spaceflight programs in terms of technology and lunar
programs in terms of timelines has raised the prospect
of a new space race in which the two countries compete
to send humans to the moon. Accelerating the U.S.
return to the moon, however, would require devoting
increased resources to the U.S. space program at time
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when the federal budget has come under greater
scrutiny. Since the Apollo program, the American public
has been unwilling to fund the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) much beyond a 1
percent share of the federal budget and at a time of
deepening budget deficits and ongoing wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan, it appears unlikely that NASA can
garner the support needed for greater budgets. Indeed,
in February 2007 the U.S. Congress passed a continuing
resolution which froze NASA’s budget at the level for
2005-06, which was a $545 million reduction in the
amount requested by the Bush administration. The
action resulted in $677 million less for the human
space flight program due to funding required for the
construction of the International Space Station and
will delay development of the new Crew Exploration
Vehicle until 2015.
Support for another space race faces an additional
hurdle. The American public is not as emotionally
invested in its space program as during the 1950s and
1960s. The historical conditions that created the space
race were unique and pitted rival superpowers in a
contest of economic systems and global support. While
many Americans recognize China as a potential threat,
most do not regard it as inimical to U.S. interests as the
Soviet Union. U.S.-China relations may be ambivalent,
but they are also ones in which extensive cooperation
takes place, and it is not apparent how defining China
as a competitor in a space race will further relations. It
is also not apparent whether the American public will
support a race which it has already won. The United
States first landed men on the moon in 1969 and may
be in no rush to return.
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Cooperate.
Alternatively, the similarities of the two space
programs have prompted calls for cooperation.
Supporters of cooperation argue that cooperation in
space has the potential to increase transparency and
trust and to lessen competitive aspects that may lead
to armed conflict.96 Supporters of cooperation also
argue that cooperation can produce dependencies on
the United States for technologies that could be used as
leverage to influence the Chinese space program in ways
advantageous to the United States and can increase the
transparency of the Chinese space program.97
A policy that treats China as a friend, however,
has its own shortcomings. Because China’s strategy
is designed to further its own national interests and
because its interests are often not aligned with U.S.
interests, it is unlikely that assisting China in increasing
its space power will eliminate these differences and
may, in fact, exacerbate them. Moreover, cooperation
in space is of limited value in advancing U.S.-China ties
considering the secondary role of space diplomacy, and
cooperation in space will not help resolve differences
over Taiwan, human rights, or Chinese economic
practices.
The most important argument against cooperation
is the possibility of the transfer of sensitive technology.
Most space technology is dual-use in nature and could
assist the Chinese in developing advanced weaponry
that could be used against U.S. forces. Nearly any
transfer of space technology directly improves
China’s military capabilities not just because space
technology is inherently dual-use, but also because
China’s space program is inherently military in nature.
While cooperation does exist between NASA and the
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U.S. military, the Chinese space program lacks the
bureaucratic walls which make NASA a predominantly
civilian organization in both focus and culture. Indeed,
China’s space program is a military-civilian joint
venture in which the military develops and operates its
satellites and runs its infrastructure, including China’s
launch sites and satellite operations center. The China
National Space Administration, often incorrectly
referred to as China’s NASA, mainly functions as a
civilian front for international cooperation and as a
liaison between the military and the defense industry.
In fact, CNSA does not even manage important space
cooperative activities like cooperation with Europe on
Galileo, which is run by the Ministry of Science and
Technology.
While technology transfer appears out of the
question, another possible avenue of cooperation
would be for China to contribute funding to gain
access to a program. However, with a total annual
space budget averaging just 1 billion RMB per year
(approximately $125 million),98 it is unlikely that China
can provide meaningful funding. While China agreed
to contribute $250 million to the Galileo project, that
amount is insignificant considering the multi-billion
dollar price tag of most space projects. Cost estimates
to return U.S. astronauts to the moon reach to $104
billion and do not include funding for robotic missions
or the $20 billion to use the Crew Exploration Vehicle
to service the International Space Station.99
Moreover, using cooperative activities to increase
transparency and trust is likely to be very difficult.
China’s ASAT test in January 2007, and its refusal to
admit the test until well after the event, demonstrated
China’s intransigence and lack of transparency
involving space matters even when provided with
incontrovertible evidence.
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Increasing trust in regards to space activities appears
to be difficult when space operations, in particular
counterspace operations, may figure prominently in
Chinese efforts to strike asymmetrically at the United
States in the event of an armed conflict.100 In the
past, cooperative efforts with China’s military have
been difficult. The Military Maritime Consultative
Agreement (MMCA), designed to reduce the risk of
accidents and miscommunication in the air and on
the sea, has been bogged down since the collision of
a Chinese fighter with a U.S. reconnaissance plane
due to Chinese insistence on using the venue to claim
sovereignty over its exclusive economic zone. Even
when the United States transferred military technology
to China during the 1980s, the Chinese were reluctant
to provide the United States with the basic motivations
for certain technologies.101 Secrecy surrounding the
Chinese space program is similarly tight, and Chinese
space experts appear to be under strict guidelines and
normally only divulge information that has already
come out in the Chinese press. China’s space experts
also appear to function as a conduit for disinformation.
One prominent Chinese space expert concludes in
an English language publication that “It is obvious
that assertions judging China’s manned spacecraft
program as a military threat are baseless.”102 Yet, in an
internal military publication the same author argues
that human spaceflight technology “can carry a large
amount of effective military payload” and can be used
for information support missions as well as function as
a weapon or as a weapons platform.103
Do Nothing.
Since the mid-1990s, the United States has had
little cooperation with China in space. Convictions
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of U.S. aerospace companies for illegally transferring
technology to China put a halt to most cooperation
between the two countries. In addition, NASA
Administrator Michael Griffin traveled to China
in September 2006 to explore the possibilities of
cooperative activities, but little came of the trip.
Inaction is a safe option that does not risk the
transfer of technology or expertise. A policy of inaction
does risk ignoring the possible benefits of cooperation,
however. As Clay Moltz writes, “It is self-defeating for
the United States to be trapped into sending signals
about the impossibility of space cooperation to emerging
powers, such as China, where threat reduction should
instead be a high U.S. security priority.”104 Refusal to
participate in multilateral space activities involving
China, for example, will unnecessarily put the United
States at a disadvantage since it will have little leverage
to address its concerns.
SEEKING TANGIBLE RESULTS
Deciding an appropriate response to China’s rise as
a major space power is made difficult by the fact that
the nature of China’s rise is uncertain. All four options
discussed above assume the future nature of China’s
role in the world. Containment and competition
not only take China as a future adversary but also
are impractical in that they do not take into account
China’s integration into world affairs or the cost to the
United States. Cooperation, on the other hand, treats
China as a friend but has the potential of transferring
technology and expertise that could improve China’s
military and appears to promise too much in regards
to acculturating China to the norms of international
space behavior. Inaction, while not fully treating China
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as an adversary, appears unable to offer opportunities
to deal with China’s rise as a major space power that
could benefit the United States.
U.S. space policy in regards to China requires an
approach in which China is treated as both a potential
friend and enemy and provides opportunities for
both countries to learn and become comfortable with
their respective roles in the world. Such a policy
would demonstrate the benefits of cooperation while
downplaying the potential of increasing China’s space
power at the expense of U.S. interests. Pursuant to
this, China’s increasing space capabilities do present
opportunities for collaboration that can provide
tangible benefits to both countries in the form of
cost savings, scientific research, and safety that do
not risk U.S. national security. For example, China
and the United States could coordinate space science
missions to derive scientific benefits and to share costs.
Coordinating space science missions with separately
developed, but complementary space assets, removes
the chance of sensitive technology transfer and allows
the two countries to combine their resources to achieve
the same effects as jointly developed missions. The
findings from these missions would be shared equally.
This approach is being used by the Europeans and
Chinese on the Double Star project to research the sun.
Such cooperation is not unprecedented when it comes
to the United States and China. The United States and
China serve as co-chairs of the 68 member Group on
Earth Observations (GEO), an intergovernmental
organization leading a worldwide effort to build a
Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS)
over the next 10 years. This group stresses coordination
rather than integration in pooling together international
resources for environmental monitoring.
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Financial considerations may make organizations
such as GEO more commonplace in the future and
make the United States more receptive to cooperative
activities. NASA’s renewed commitment to human
spaceflight has resulted in static funding for space
science missions. NASA projects that funding for its
Exploration Systems Mission Directorate, which is
responsible for its human spaceflight program, will
increase from $1.733 billion in 2006 to $7.993 billion in
2012. At the same time, funding for the Science Mission
Directorate will remain relatively stable, with $1.325
billion allocated in 2006 and $1.353 billion in 2012.
NASA is currently involved with scientific missions
that could benefit from international cooperation with
China. The most notable scientific missions are the
two countries’ lunar programs. Both the United States
and China are planning robotic missions to the moon
involving surveying by orbiting satellites and landings
on the moon surface. Another possible opportunity for
cooperation could be planned missions to study black
holes. The United States is teaming with other countries
to launch in 2008 the Gamma-ray Large Area Telescope
to study how black holes eject jets of gas at extreme
speeds. China is also planning to launch in 2010 an
X-ray telescope to research black holes. Similarly, the
United States and Canada are cooperating on a new
Mars lander to study the habitability of the red planet.
Such exploration could be done in conjunction with
the Russian-Chinese effort to send a Mars rover-type
vehicle to Mars.
Cooperation could also have benefits in the realm of
human space flight by increasing safety in space.105 The
United States and China already have an agreement to
assist stranded astronauts on the earth; this agreement
could be extended to space. Having the option to use
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Chinese spacecraft to rescue astronauts or cosmonauts
manning the Space Shuttle, International Space Station,
or the future Orion spacecraft seems to be a pragmatic
goal.106 In these situations, only the Russians could
provide rescue, and even that could be threatened if
political unrest in Kazakhstan were to prevent launches
from Baikonur. Developing a code of conduct for space
travel, similar to those governing travel on the high seas
obligating assistance to crews in peril, would increase
the safety of one of the most dangerous occupations.
Such a code of conduct would require the Chinese to
practice docking with the International Space Station
and U.S. spacecraft to ensure safety and reliability. It
would also require U.S. spacecraft to dock with the
planned Chinese space station. A side benefit of a code
of conduct to assist endangered astronauts in space
may be an increase in the transparency of the Chinese
space program. Cooperation would necessarily entail
discussions over technology, policies, and intent that
would otherwise be difficult to obtain.

CONCLUSION
The rise of a peer competitor in space raises
important concerns for the United States. China has
made great progress in space technologies in absolute
terms, but when compared to the other space powers,
it continues to lag behind. Much of the attention on
China’s progress in space technologies is due to it
starting from a low base. While progress of the more
advanced U.S. space program is largely incremental,
China’s progress is more rapid due to the addition of
new systems.
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Nevertheless, China’s progress in the space arena
cannot be discounted. China is probably truthful
when it says that it is not in a space race. It neither has
a sufficient foundation nor the resources to conduct
one. Yet, China’s rise as a space power will most likely
have a net negative-sum effect for the United States
over the long term. It has clearly laid a foundation to
become a peer. Moreover, while Chinese technology
and operations tempo may not equal those of the major
space powers, as China’s space technology improves
and becomes more reliable, whether China’s space
technology matches the major space powers may
become irrelevant. At some point, its technology may
simply be good enough to support modern war and be
competitive in the marketplace. Taking satellite imagery
as an example, one-meter resolution satellite imagery,
now widely available commercially, is considered the
threshold for widespread military utility. China does
not need to develop technologies with capabilities on
a par with U.S. satellite capabilities to achieve desired
effects.
Because of this, it is doubtful that merely staying
one generation ahead of the competition, as advocated
by the Report of the Commission to Assess United States
National Security Space Management and Organization,
will be enough to maintain effective leadership in
this area. Even if U.S. space power does not decline in
absolute terms, China’s advance in space technologies
will result in relative gains that challenge the U.S.
position in space.
While relative decline for the United States in space
technologies is unavoidable, it need not lead to a loss
of leadership. The rise of a new space power requires
two responses from the United States: domestic and
international. Domestically, the reliance of the space
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industry on government clients requires a broad-based
response by both the U.S. Government and industry.
Without a stable, adequately funded, organized, and
staffed space industry, it will be difficult to master the
technologies needed to meet the military, commercial,
and political challenges of a Chinese space program.
This will not only require better program management
on the part of industry and government, but will also
require both actors to think innovatively about how to
attract and maintain a competent workforce.
As China’s space power grows, space diplomacy
will also have a role in meeting the challenges of
China’s space program. This monograph argues that
a program of limited cooperation with China that
focuses on tangible benefits for both countries is best
suited to meet those challenges. Space activities are
multifaceted, and the U.S.-China space relationship
need not be solely defined by military considerations.
Nevertheless, the inherently military nature of the
Chinese space program and its lack of transparency
and tendency towards disinformation preclude most
forms of cooperation. By focusing cooperation on the
safety of space travel and improving science, however,
NASA can contribute to its mission while meeting the
challenges of a growing space power.
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APPENDIX
CHINESE SPACE LAUNCHES BY SPACECRAFT
2001-05
YEAR

DATE

NAME

Description

2001

9 January

Shenzhou-2

Unmanned Space Capsule

2002

25 March

Shenzhou-3

Unmanned Space Capsule

2002

15 May

Fengyun-1D

Meteorological

2002

15 May

Haiyang-1

Oceanography

2002

15 September

Pioneer-1

Rocket test (failure)

2002

27 October

Ziyuan-2

Remote Sensing

2002

20 December

Shenzhou-4

Unmanned Space Capsule

2003

24 May

Beidou-2A

Navigation and Positioning

2003

16 September

Pioneer-1

Rocket Test

2003

15 October

Shenzhou-5

Manned Space Capsule

2003

21 October

Ziyuan-1B

Remote Sensing

2003

21 October

Innovation-1

Communications

2003

2 November

Return Satellite18

Remote sensing/scientific

2003

14 November

Chinasat-20

Communications

2003

30 December

Explorer-1

Double Star solar wind study

2004

18 April

Satel
Experimental
lite-1

Remote Sensing

2004

18 April

Nanosatellite-1

Experimental test

2004

25 July

Explorer-2

Double Star solar wind study

2004

29 August

Return Satellite19

Remote Sensing

2004

9 September

Shijian-6A

Space environment study

2004

9 September

Shijian-6B

Space environment study
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2004

27 September

Return Satellite20

Remote Sensing

2004

19 October

Fengyun-2C

Meteorological

2004

6 November

Ziyuan-2 03

Remote Sensing

2004

18 November

Experiment-2

Technology demonstration

2005

12 April

Apstar-6

Commercial Communications

2005

5 July

Shijian-7

Space environment

2005

2 August

Return Satellite21

Remote sensing/scientific

2005

29 August

Return Satellite22

Remote sensing/scientific

2005

12 October

Shenzhou-6

Manned Space Capsule
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